When nearly $200 million is wagered on the 2026 midterms through federally regulated prediction markets, election officials warn the odds are being used to spread claims of fraud, and members of Congress can trade on outcomes they influence, what do religious teachings about gambling and constitutional principles about election integrity say?
The Quran forbids gambling because it sows enmity and distracts from what matters; the Mishnah says the gambler cannot be trusted as a witness; the Buddha says the winner breeds hatred and the loser mourns; Christian teaching warns about what the love of money cultivates. None of them contemplated betting on one's own government, which is worse on every count they name. The Constitution leaves election administration to the states and Congress, and states banned election wagering for a century for reasons that are now being relearned in real time. Prediction markets are legal, sometimes informative, and regulated. They are also a mechanism by which fraud claims get laundered as odds and officials can profit from what they know. The founders' answer to that was structural — keep the stake out of the hands of those who decide — and the structure is only half built.
Religious perspectives
This is one of the few current questions where the religious traditions are more specific than the law. Gambling is directly addressed in several of them, and betting on the outcome of a community's own self-government adds a second layer.
Islam: The Quran prohibits gambling (maysir) outright and explains why: "Intoxicants, gambling, idolatrous sacrifices, and divining arrows are an abomination of Satan's handiwork, so avoid them... Satan only wants to sow enmity and hatred among you through intoxicants and gambling, and to hinder you from the remembrance of God and from prayer" (Quran 5:90-91). Quran 2:219 acknowledges gambling has "some benefit for people" but says its sin is greater. The stated harm — enmity, hatred, and distraction from what matters — is a precise description of what election officials say the markets are doing.
Judaism: The Mishnah disqualifies the habitual dice player from serving as a witness in court (Sanhedrin 24b), and the rabbis debated whether this is because gambling is a form of theft (the loser never truly consents) or because the gambler contributes nothing to the community's welfare. Either reason applies. Jewish law also insists that those who judge a matter must have no stake in it (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 7:12) — the principle behind the concern about lawmakers trading on outcomes they shape.
Christianity: Scripture does not name gambling as a sin, and casting lots was an accepted way of discerning God's will (Acts 1:26). The tradition's objection is to what gambling cultivates: "the love of money is a root of all kinds of evils" (1 Timothy 6:10), and stewardship teaching holds that wealth is a trust to be used for the common good rather than staked on chance. Catholic teaching (Catechism 2413) permits games of chance but says they become morally unacceptable when they deprive someone of what is necessary or when the game is rigged. Christian teaching on the neighbor also bears on markets that profit when a fabricated poll or a fraud claim moves the odds.
Buddhism: The Sigalovada Sutta names gambling as one of six ways of squandering wealth, with specific consequences: the winner breeds hatred, the loser mourns his loss, and the gambler's word is not trusted. Right livelihood excludes trades that profit from others' harm.
The honest counterweight: Prediction markets are not only gambling; they aggregate information, and in 2024 they called several states the polls missed. Defenders argue that traders who act on misinformation lose money, which makes the markets a filter rather than a source. Christianity in particular does not forbid the activity, and Jewish and Islamic teaching tolerate ordinary commercial risk. The traditions' concern is narrower and sharper: what happens to a community when its own decisions become something to bet on.
Constitutional & legal framework
The Constitution says nothing about gambling, and a great deal about who controls elections and what protects public confidence in them. Prediction markets on elections sit at the intersection.
What is happening: An NBC News analysis found nearly $200 million in trading on midterm outcomes on Kalshi and Polymarket by August 2026. Election officials say they are concerned about insider trading and about the odds being used to influence public perception. On August 26, Senator Alex Padilla wrote to both companies noting that "paid partnership" influencer posts used prediction-market odds to support baseless claims of election fraud and were taken down only after news coverage. A fabricated polling firm released fake polls in August; Kalshi says its markets barely moved, which it cites as evidence the markets filter misinformation. Kalshi's own founders donated to candidates of both parties, and both companies have sharply increased lobbying. The Senate unanimously adopted a rule in April barring senators and staff from betting on prediction markets; no such rule binds the House or executive officials, and trades were reported ahead of U.S. military actions in Venezuela and Iran.
The legal framework: The Commodity Exchange Act lets the CFTC prohibit event contracts that involve "gaming" or are "contrary to the public interest" (7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)). In 2024, the D.C. Circuit in KalshiEX v. CFTC allowed congressional-control contracts to proceed, and in 2025 the CFTC under new leadership dropped its opposition, calling prior restrictions "a sinkhole of legal uncertainty." The CFTC announced a formal rulemaking in January 2026. States have pushed back: Nevada's gaming regulator forced Kalshi to geofence election contracts, and a Washington court enjoined them. Whether federal commodities law preempts state gambling law is unresolved and headed for the courts.
The Elections Clause: Article I, Section 4 assigns the "Times, Places and Manner" of federal elections to state legislatures, subject to congressional override. States have long treated betting on elections as a threat to those elections — many states banned it in the nineteenth century after wagers were used to corrupt outcomes — and a federal commodities regulator authorizing what state election law forbids raises a genuine federalism question that Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council (2013) and Moore v. Harper (2023) only partly address.
Conflicts of interest: The STOCK Act of 2012 prohibits members of Congress from trading on nonpublic information, and the Senate's April rule extends that logic to election bets. But a member who can shape a bill's fate, or an official who knows when a strike is coming, has information the market does not. The Emoluments Clauses and the founders' broader concern with officials profiting from office (Federalist No. 51's "auxiliary precautions") speak to the principle even where no statute yet reaches the conduct.
The honest other side: Prediction markets have a defensible First Amendment and informational case: they aggregate dispersed knowledge, they were more accurate than polling averages in 2024, and traders who act on false information are punished by the market itself. Kalshi is licensed and federally regulated, has enforced insider-trading rules against individual traders, and argues that fake polls demonstrate the markets' value rather than their danger. Congress has not banned election betting, and the CFTC has decided it is lawful. The constitutional problem is not that people bet; it is that a system designed to keep money and self-interest out of the administration of elections now has a federally sanctioned channel for both, with the rules for officials written only halfway.
See: CRS: Prediction Markets — Policy Issues for Congress → | 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2 → | Sen. Padilla letter (Aug. 26, 2026) → | Elections Clause →
Sources cited:BibleTorahQuranBuddhismConstitutionFederalist PapersSupreme Court