Project Middle Ground
Free Speech & Media

When eight people who attended a protest outside an ICE detention center are sentenced to between 30 and 100 years in prison under terrorism charges — longer than any January 6 defendant received — after a presidential memorandum directs agencies to target "left-wing" groups, what do religious traditions and the Constitution say about proportionate punishment and guilt by association?

Bottom line

Every religious tradition examined here affirms that shooting a peace officer deserves serious punishment and that each person may be punished only for what that person did. The Constitution says the same: Claiborne Hardware forbids extending liability for violence to everyone who marched, Brandenburg protects zines, and no statute lets a president designate a domestic ideology as a terrorist organization. A jury convicted these defendants, and appeals will test whether the "cell" theory holds. But sentences of 30 to 100 years for people not accused of violence — imposed under a memo aimed at one side of the political spectrum — are the kind of state action both the prophets and the founders warned about, whichever side it targets.

Religious perspectives

Religious traditions do not ask a community to be indifferent to an officer being shot. What they insist on is that punishment fit the act of the person being punished, and that the innocent not be swept up with the guilty.

Judaism: The Torah's most famous statement on punishment — "eye for eye, tooth for tooth" (Exodus 21:24) — was understood by the rabbis as a ceiling, not a license: the penalty may not exceed the harm. Deuteronomy 25:2-3 caps lashes at forty "lest, if one should go on to beat him with more stripes than these, your brother be degraded in your sight." Deuteronomy 24:16 is explicit about collective punishment: "Fathers shall not be put to death because of their children, nor children put to death because of their fathers. Each one shall be put to death for his own sin." The Talmud's evidentiary rules (Sanhedrin 37b) demand that a court establish what each accused person actually did.

Christianity: Jesus' teaching on the wheat and the tares (Matthew 13:24-30) is a warning against uprooting the innocent in the effort to remove the guilty. Paul's instruction that governing authorities are "God's servant for your good" and "an avenger who carries out God's wrath on the wrongdoer" (Romans 13:4) cuts both ways here: it affirms the state's duty to punish the person who shot a police officer, and it limits that vengeance to "the wrongdoer." Micah 6:8 — "do justice, and love kindness" — has never been read to permit justice without measure.

Islam: The Quran states the principle of individual responsibility repeatedly: "No bearer of burdens shall bear the burden of another" (Quran 6:164, 17:15, 35:18, 53:38). Quran 5:8 commands: "Do not let the hatred of a people prevent you from being just. Be just; that is nearer to righteousness." The instruction is aimed precisely at the case where the accused are politically despised. At the same time, Quran 5:33 treats those who wage war against a community with great severity — Islamic law does not treat an attack on public order lightly.

Buddhism: The Dhammapada opens with the teaching that "hatred is never appeased by hatred in this world" (verse 5). Buddhist ethics evaluate intention: a person who came to make noise with fireworks and a person who came to shoot are not the same actor, whatever they wore. Right speech also forbids the community from labeling people beyond what the evidence shows.

The honest counterweight: A police officer, Lt. Thomas Gross, was shot and wounded that night. A jury heard 45 witnesses and more than 200 exhibits across twelve days and convicted. Religious traditions take an attack on those who keep the peace seriously, and none of them treats a jury's finding as something to be dismissed because the defendants' politics are sympathetic. The question is not whether punishment was warranted, but whether the punishment imposed on each person matched what that person did.

Constitutional & legal framework

The Prairieland case is the first sentencing under the administration's effort to treat "antifa" as a terrorist organization, and it tests three constitutional principles at once: proportionality, guilt by association, and whether an executive order can create a category of domestic terrorist that Congress never did.

What happened: On July 4, 2025, a demonstration outside the Prairieland ICE Detention Center in Alvarado, Texas ended in vandalism and the nonfatal shooting of an Alvarado police officer. Federal prosecutors charged nine people with rioting, weapons and explosives offenses (the "explosives" were fireworks), obstruction, and providing material support to terrorists; one, Benjamin Song, was charged with attempted murder. A jury convicted in March 2026. On June 23, 2026, Song was sentenced to 100 years; Maricela Rueda to 70; five others to 50 each; and Daniel Sanchez Estrada, who did not attend the protest and was convicted of concealing a box of zines afterward, to 30. Seven others who pleaded guilty received a combined 106 years. The Justice Department described the defendants as a "North Texas Antifa Cell" and noted these were the first sentences since the president's September 2025 executive order designating antifa a domestic terrorist organization. That order was followed by National Security Presidential Memorandum 7 (NSPM-7), directing federal agencies to investigate and disrupt groups linked to "left-wing violence."

The designation problem: Congress created a statutory process for designating foreign terrorist organizations (8 U.S.C. § 1189). There is no equivalent domestic designation statute, in large part because of the First Amendment. An executive order cannot create one. The material-support statute used here, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, criminalizes support for specified violent crimes, not membership in a designated group — which means the government's "cell" framing did legal work in the courtroom that the statute itself does not authorize. Prosecutors argued that wearing black, using an encrypted messaging app, and distributing zines were evidence of an organized terrorist enterprise.

Guilt by association: In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware (1982), a unanimous Supreme Court held that liability for violence at a protest cannot be extended to people who merely participated in the protest or shared its goals: "Civil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a group, some members of which committed acts of violence." Scales v. United States (1961) requires that membership-based criminal liability rest on knowing, active membership with specific intent to further illegal aims. Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) protects advocacy — including advocacy of force — unless it is directed to and likely to produce imminent lawless action. Distributing zines is advocacy.

Proportionality: The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments," and Solem v. Helm (1983) held that it contains a proportionality principle for sentences. That principle has been applied narrowly outside the death penalty (Harmelin v. Michigan, 1991; Ewing v. California, 2003), so appellate relief on this ground alone is uncertain. But the comparison the defendants' supporters draw is factual: the sentences exceed those imposed on any January 6 defendant, including those convicted of seditious conspiracy, and the January 6 defendants were later pardoned.

The honest other side: Shooting a police officer is attempted murder, and the jury found that Song did it. Federal judges — Mark Pittman and Reed O'Connor, both Senate-confirmed — imposed the sentences after trial, and Judge Pittman said from the bench that if this was a peaceful protest he would "hate to see what they'd consider to be not peaceful." The convictions are on appeal, and the appellate courts, not press releases on either side, will decide whether the material-support theory survives. Criticism of the sentences and defense of them are both legitimate; what is not legitimate under the Constitution is treating the political label attached to a defendant as evidence.

See: DOJ sentencing release → | 18 U.S.C. § 2339A → | NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware → | Brandenburg v. Ohio → | Eighth Amendment →

Sources cited:BibleTorahQuranBuddhismConstitutionSupreme Court